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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Issue 1:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that Mrs.

Boyer was not awarded an equitable interest with Mr. Boyer in the commercial building on
25 Street in Ogden, Utah, where Mr. Boyer conducts his business.
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant
to this appeal issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum.
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this
appeal issue: Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jensen v.
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985);
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1998); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. Jensen
v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
5

Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice
of Appeal.
Issue 2:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in not awarding Mrs.

Boyer any share of Mr. Boyer's retirement accounts.
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be
wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases
are relevant to this appeal issue: Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); Riley v.
Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. Riley v.
Riley, 138 P.3d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 720 (Utah Ct.
App. 2003).
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice
of Appeal.
Issue 3:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in ordering that the

alimony awarded to Mrs. Boyer, from Mr. Boyer, be structured to be reduced over a certain
period of time.
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant
to this appeal issue.
6

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum.
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this
appeal issue: Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d
84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v.
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion.
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008).
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice
of Appeal.
Issue 4:

Whether the District Court made an error in regard to Mrs. Boyer's

actual alimony award and whether it is erroneous the Court order states that alimony
commences July 1, 2008, for at least two, five year periods, and then for another period of
time after.
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant
to this appeal issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum.
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or
7

determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this
appeal issue: Allred v. Alfred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Richardson v.
Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006);
Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct.
App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is clearly erroneous. Allred v.
Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice
of Appeal.
Issue 5:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion and did not address the

issue of fault on the alimony award where Mr. Boyer passed a social/venereal disease to Mrs.
Boyer during the parties marriage as a result of Mr. Boyer's infidelity.
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant
to this appeal issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum.
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this
appeal issue: Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d
8

84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v.
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion.
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008).
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice
of Appeal.
Issue 6:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in its alimony award by

not considering the Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as a result of obtaining a social/venereal
disease from Mr. Boyer.
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant
to this appeal issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum.
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this
appeal issue: Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d
84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v.
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion.
9

Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008).
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice
of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from a final order of the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, specifically an appeal from
the following:
a. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,2009,
signed on March 25, 2010, entered on or about March 26, 2010.
b. Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,2009, signed on March 25,
2010, entered on or about March 26, 2010.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE DISPOSITION BELOW:
The trial court awarded the entire interest Mr. Boyer had in the commercial building
on 25th Street to Mr. Boyer, without equitable distribution, as his separate property. The trial
court did award alimony to Mrs. Boyer, set up in a tiered structure. Each party was awarded
their own retirement account.
Mrs. Boyer, through this appeal, is seeking to have an equitable distribution or set-off
of the property above, is seeking an equitable distribution or "Woodward" share of Mr.
Boyer's retirement account, and is seeking to adjust and clarify the alimony award.
10

C. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. and Mrs. Boyer married on July 10, 1993. {Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 2)
2. Three children have been born as issue to the marriage. {Amended Decree of
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 2)
3. Mrs. Boyer filed for Divorce against Mr. Boyer in March of 2007. {Amended
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June I, 2009, pg. 2)
4. Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (Trial
Transcript, hereinafter: "TT" at pg. 487,11.24-25, pg. 489,1. 1, pg. 23,11. 17-22.)
5. Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that during the marriage she had
contracted a sexual transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-10, pg. 508,11.
5-17.)
6. Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that as a result of the sexually
transmitted disease she received from Mr. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer had to have surgery, where she
had part of her cervix removed and then she had a cone biopsy because she had carcinoma
insi2, and as a further result of this, Mrs. Boyer had to have a complete and total
hysterectomy, where she had her uterus and an ovary removed. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-17)
7. The parties were awarded joint custody of their children. {Amended Decree of
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 2)
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8. During the marriage, Mrs. Boyer worked part time, earning approximately $11.50
an hour, where Mr. Boyer was employed as a stock broker and financial advisor. {Amended
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 4, 5)
9. The Court found Mrs. Boyer was thirty-eight (38) years old and employed as a
bookkeeper for her father-in-law, and found it appropriate to impute her to full-time status
with her hourly rate of $ 11.50 an hour. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June
I 2009, pg. 4-5)
10. The Court found Mrs. Boyer's salary, imputing a full-time wage, to be $1,993.00
per month, less $399.00 of mandatory deductions, to find Mrs. Boyer's net income to be
approximately $ 1,594.00 per month. {Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June
1, 2009, pg. 5)
11. The Court found that Mrs. Boyer would receive child support of $677.00 per
month, giving Mrs. Boyer a net monthly income of $2,271.00. {Amended Decree of Divorce
Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 5)
12. Mr. Boyer's income was disputed during trial. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 5, 6)
13. The Court did find that Mr. Boyer was earning approximately $160,000 per year,
from 1994-2003. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June I, 2009, pg. 5)
14. The Court found that Mr. Boyer's discretionary cash flow for his business and for
12

the purpose of establishing alimony and child support, is approximately $110,000 per year.
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 7)
15. The Court found that after anticipated taxes, Mr. Boyer would have a net income
of approximately $6,600.00 per month. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To
June 1, 2009, pg. 7)
16. The Court found Mrs. Boyer's reasonable monthly expenses of approximately
$4,967.00 per month. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June I, 2009, pg. 7)
17. The Court found that including Mrs. Boyer's imputed net income of $ 1,594.00 per
month and including child support from Mr. Boyer at $677.00 per month, Mrs. Boyer's net
income is $2,271.00 per month, which leaves Mrs. Boyer a $2,696.00 short-fall each month.
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 7)
18. The Court found that Mr. Boyer's reasonable monthly expense for himself and the
children is approximately $5,762.00 per month, where adding his child support obligation of
$677.00 per month, Mr. Boyer has reasonable monthly expenses of $6,439.00 per month and
leaves him with $217.00 per month. {Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1,
2009, pg.7)
19. The Court found that to equalize the parties' standard of living, that Mr. Boyer is
ordered to pay Mrs. Boyer $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years,
commencing July 1,2008. {Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg.
13

8)
20. The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00 per month on July
1,2013, for another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until
December 31,2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. {Amended Decree of Divorce
Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8)
21. During the parties' marriage, Mr. Boyer had acquired a partnership interest in a
commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business.
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8)
22. The Court found Mr. Boyer's portion of the building, after calculating liabilities,
to have a net value of approximately $20,300.00, where Mrs. Boyer was not awarded a share
of the building. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8)
23. The Court awarded each party their own retirement account without detailed
findings. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 9)
24. Mr. Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately $12,500, where Mrs.
Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately $2,500. {Amended Decree of
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 9)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. and Mrs. Boyer married on July 10, 1993, where Mrs. Boyer filed for divorce
against Mr. Boyer in March of 2007, approximately just under fourteen (14) years of
14

marriage.
During the marriage, Mr. Boyer was employed (and self employed) as a financial
planner, and had acquired a partnership interest in a commercial building, located at 204 25
Street, Ogden, Utah. Mr. Boyer conducts his business at this building on 25th Street. The
Court found Mr. Boyer's portion of the building, after calculating liabilities, to have a net
value of approximately $20,300.00. Mrs. Boyer was not awarded a share of the building.
Mrs. Boyer is entitled to one-half of the value of the building.
During the marriage, both Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer had accumulated a retirement
account. At the time trial, Mr. Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately
$12,500, where Mrs. Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately $2,500. The
Court found that each party retain their own retirement account. Mrs. Boyer is entitled to a
"Woodward" share of Mr. Boyer's retirement account.
During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Boyer was unfaithful, and committed
adultery by having sexual relations with a woman who was not Mrs. Boyer. As a result of
Mr. Boyer's unfaithfulness, he impregnated another woman, and a child has been born.
Further, Mr. Boyer's unfaithfulness actions caused Mrs. Boyer to receive a sexually
transmitted disease. Although Mrs. Boyer did receive an alimony award, it appears the Court
did not consider the fault of Mr. Boyer for his adulterous actions, and it further appears the
Court did not take into consideration when factoring its alimony award the health problems
15

and concerns that Mrs. Boyer now must suffer with. Regarding the alimony award to Mrs.
Boyer, the Court should take into consideration the fault of Mr. Boyer for his unfaithfulness
and the Court should further take into consideration the health concerns and problems that
Mrs. Boyer had suffered from and will suffer from because of Mr. Boyer's act of committing
adultery.
Further, in regard to the alimony award, the Court did not include any findings or
reasoning for reducing the alimony award over a certain period of time. The reduction in the
alimony award is significant, nearly being cut in half. The Court should not reduce the
alimony award over time, especially where there is no reason for the reduction.
Finally, an error has been made in the length and amount of the alimony award. The
Court awarded Mrs. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428.00 each month for a period of
five years, commencing on July 1, 2008. The Court then reduced the alimony award to
$1,000.00 per month to take effect on July 1, 2013 for a period of five years. Further, the
Court then awarded a further reduced amount of alimony to $800.00 per month until
December 31, 2015, at which time the alimony is then to terminate. Two errors exist here.
The first error that exists here is that it was the Court's intention that Mrs. Boyer receive
alimony at a $ 1,000.00 for five years beginning July 1,2013, hence the five year time period
at the $1,000 rate would cease July 1, 2018. The obvious problem here is that there are
conflicting awards. On one hand, the alimony at $800 per month is to cease December 31,
16

2015; however, alimony at $1,000 is to cease July, 2018 (plus it is continue at an amount of
$800). It is clear the Court intended Mrs. Boyer to receive alimony for ten (10) years at
different amounts, and then for her to receive alimony for another time period at $800.00 a
month. If Mrs. Boyer does not receive a permanent award of alimony, the award then should
at least be for the duration of the length of the parties marriage.
The second error that exists, is that although the Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009 states that alimony should be set at $1,428.00, for five years,
beginning July 1,2008, the actual amount Judge Lyon awarded when reciting the provisions
of the decree of divorce was that of $1,457.00. At a minimum, the Decree of Divorce should
contain the figure of $1,457.00 for alimony in lieu of the $1,428.00 figure.
ARGUMENT
Issue 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that
Mrs. Boyer was not awarded an equitable interest with Mr. Boyer in the commercial
building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where Mr. Boyer conducts his business.
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal.
Mr. Boyer works as a financial planner, and during he and Mrs. Boyer's marriage
relationship, Mr. Boyer acquired a partnership interest in a commercial building located at
204 25 Street, Ogden, Utah, which is the same location Mr. Boyer operates and conducts his
business. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) The Court
found Mr. Boyer's portion of the building, after calculating liabilities, to have a net value of
17

approximately $20,300.00, where Mrs. Boyer was not awarded a share of the building.
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8)
Mr. Boyer cannot come up with any legal reasoning as to why the partial interest he
has in the building located at 204 25 Street in Ogden should not be equitably divided as
marital property. In Mortensen v. Mortensen, a Utah Supreme Court case, the Court analyzed
property divisions in divorce matters, and reasoned that such divisions should be "equitable"
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1998).
This type of reasoning was echoed recently by the Stonehocker v. Stonehocker case,
when Stonehocker quoted the following excerpt from Mortensen: "Any significant disparity
in the division of the remaining property should be based on an equitable rationale other than
on the sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts of inheritance." Stonehocker, 176
P.3d 476,483 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The Stonehocker
Court was addressing the issue of the trial court providing an equitable division of marital
property, which in most instances does not include gifts or inheritances. Id. In fact, the Utah
Court of Appeals has stated that "[m]arital property is ordinarily all property acquired during
the marriage and it 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties,
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,
1317-1318 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
The Dunn case addressed "marital property" and the equitable division aspect of it by
18

holding the following:
Thus, the corporation was founded and operated through the joint efforts and
sacrifices of the parties. In addition, because Dr. Dunn chose to work sixty to
seventy hours per week, he left Mrs. Dunn with the sole responsibility of
running the household and managing the household accounts. Further, she was
left without his companionship and domestic contributions during those hours.
While she was not his partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was
his partner in the "business" of marriage and her efforts were necessary
contributions to the growth of his practice and the business. As such, she is
entitled to her fair share in any marital assets derived from their joint efforts in
that endeavor.
Id. at 1319 (citations omitted).
Further, the Utah Court of Appeal admonished trial courts handling divorce matters
with property disputes the following counsel: "The court should first properly categorize the
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other.
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property andfiftypercent of
the marital property." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 at 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Here, Mr. Boyer had a partial interest in the commercial building at 204 25 Street,
where he conducts his business. The building was not acquired as a gift nor inheritance, but
rather was acquired on Mr. Boyer's behalf during the marriage and should be considered
marital property. Although Mrs. Boyer did not work for Mr. Boyer's financial team, the
building is considered marital property. The Court should divide equally (or provide an
offset) that of Mr. Boyer's partial interest on the building located on 25 Street with Mrs.
Boyer.
19

Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in not awarding Mrs.
Boyer any share of Mr. Boyer's retirement accounts.

This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal.
At the time of the parties' divorce trial, Mr. Boyer was found to have a retirement
account valued at approximately $12,500, where Mrs. Boyer was found to have a retirement
account valued at approximately $2,500. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To
June 1, 2009, pg. 9) Without any detailed findings or analysis, the Court awarded each party
their own separate retirement account. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June
l,2009,pg.9)
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of spouses dividing their retirement
accounts by reasoning the following:
. . . [Pjension or retirement benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the
employer. If the rights to those benefits are acquired during the marriage, then
the court must at least consider those benefits in making an equitable
distribution of the marital assets. " 'The right to receive monies in the future is
unquestionably . . . an economic resource' subject to equitable distribution
based upon proper computation of its present dollar value."
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted).
The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed the equitable division of retirement
benefits between a divorcing husband and wife by stating the following:
Although "retirement accounts are part of the marital estate and they are
generally to be equitably divided,... 'an unequal division of marital property.
.. is . . . justified when the trial court memorializes in commendably detailed
20

findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution.'"
Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted).
As demonstrated by the Woodward and Riley Courts, retirement accounts accrued
during a marriage are to be equitably divided amongst divorcing spouses. See generally,
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, see generally, Riley, 138 P.3d 84. If a trial court proceeds with an
unequal distribution of the retirement account(s), the trial court must memorialize in
"commendably detailed findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution."
See Riley, 138P.3dat89.
Here, the trial Court awarded each party their own retirement account, which varied
significantly, however the trial court did not provide the detailed findings as its required to as
dictated in the Woodward and Riley. Mrs. Boyer should be awarded an equitable distribution
or proper offset of Mr. Boyer's retirement.
Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in ordering that the
alimony awarded to Mrs. Boyer, from Mr. Boyer, be structured to be reduced over a
certain period of time.
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal.
The Court ordered Mr. Boyer to pay Mrs. Boyer $ 1,428.00 in alimony each month for
a period of five (5) years, commencing July 1,2008. {Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc Pro
Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00
per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to
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$800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate.
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8)
Utah courts follow the premise that, "[w]hen reviewing a [district] court determination
of alimony . . . an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion." Richardson v.
Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted). The Richardson Court
further reasoned that when making alimony determinations, "a district court considers several
factors, including (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability
of the recipient spouse to produce sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support." Id. (citations omitted).
A further analysis of alimony contains that "a district court also considers the primary
aims of alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of
each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Id.
(citations omitted).
A recent Utah Supreme Court case addressed the issue of prospective changes to
alimony by stating: "Generally, it is true that, because of the uncertainty of future events,
prospective changes to alimony are disfavored." Id. at 944 (citations omitted). The
Richardson Court continued its analysis by providing the following example: "Thus, a plan to
retire, without actually retiring, would be insufficient to justify a prospective alimony
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reduction." Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court awarded alimony in favor of Mrs. Boyer, wherein the award was
prospectively reduced after set time periods. The Court in this instance should not have
reduced the monthly dollar alimony award after set time periods, especially where the trial
court did not provide adequate findings nor reasoning for the reduction.
Issue 4: Whether the District Court made an error in regard to Mrs. Boyer's
actual alimony award and whether it is clearly erroneous the Court orders alimony to
terminate December 31,2015, where the Court's order states that alimony commences
July 1, 2008, for at least two, five year periods, and then for another period of time
after.
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal.
The Court ordered Mr. Boyer to pay Mrs. Boyer $ 1,428.00 in alimony each month for
a period of five (5) years, commencing July 1,2008. (Amended Decree ofDivorce Nunc Pro
Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00
per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to
$800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate.
(Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8)
The Utah Appeals Court follows a standard of review of clearly erroneous when the
issue is if the award given by the trial court is contrary to its intent. Allredv. Alfred, 835 P.2d
974, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Allred Court continued by noting that it only reverses its
awards if "we determine that it is not based on substantial evidence or if it is clearly
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erroneous." Id. at 978-979 (citations omitted).
Part of the trial court order dictated by the trial Court Judge at the conclusion of the
parties' divorce trial differs than what the actual language is as contained in the order drafted
by Mr. Boyer's counsel. When Judge Lyon verbally gave his order, he initially stated in
regard to an alimony award that Mr. Boyer pay Mrs. Boyer an amount of $1,457 per month
for aperiod of five years, commencing July 1,2008. (TT atpg. 1061,11.18-20). The amount
of alimony contained in the order at $1,428 should be changed to reflect what the Judge
actually had dictated.
Further, the other "error" contained in this issue is the actual duration or termination
of the alimony award. The Court awarded Mrs. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428
(disputed at $ 1,457) per month for a period of five years, commencing on July 1,2008. The
Court then awarded alimony for another five years, to commence on July 1, 2013, at $1,000
per month. The Court then reduced the alimony award even further to $800 per month to
take place after the alimony award of $ 1,000 has run its course, but the Court also terminates
the $800 alimony award December 31, 2015.
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) addresses alimony in the following way:
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
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(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse;
and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
It was the Court's intention that Mrs. Boyer receive alimony at a $1,000.00 for five
years beginning July 1,2013, hence the five year time period at the $1,000 rate would cease
July 1, 2018. It is clear the Court intended Mrs. Boyer to receive alimony for ten (10) years
at different amounts, and then for her to receive alimony for another time period at $800.00 a
month. The error here is that alimony cannot terminate on December 31, 2015, and also
continue to July 2018, and continue even further pas that date with a different amount. If
Mrs. Boyer does not receive a permanent award of alimony, the award then should at least be
for the duration of the length of the parties marriage.
Issue 5: Whether the District Court abused its discretion and did not address the
issue of fault on the alimony award where Mr. Boyer passed a social/venereal disease to
Mrs. Boyer during the parties marriage as a result of Mr. Boyer's infidelity.
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal
Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (TT at pg.
487,11.24-25, pg. 489,1. l,pg.23,ll. 17-22.) Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer
that during the marriage she had contracted a sexual transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer.
(TT at pg. 497,11. 8-10, pg. 508,11. 5-17.) Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer
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that as a result of the sexually transmitted disease she received from Mr. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer
had to have surgery, where she had part of her cervix removed and then she had a cone
biopsy because she had carcinoma insi2, and as a further result of this, Mrs. Boyer had to
have a complete and total hysterectomy, where she had her uterus and an ovary removed.
(TTatpg.497,11. 8-17)
Utah courts follow the premise that, "[w]hen reviewing a [district] court determination
of alimony... an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion." Richardson, 201 P.3d
at 943 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted). The Richardson Court further reasoned that when
making alimony determinations, "a district court considers several factors, including (1) the
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to
produce sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Id.
(citations omitted).
A further analysis of alimony contains that "a district court also considers the primary
aims of alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of
each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Id.
(citations omitted).
Further, Riley quotes Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b) which allows a court to consider
the fault of the parties in determining an alimony award. Riley 138 P.3d at 88. In Riley the
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husband committed extra marital affairs, and the court considered "fault" when structuring its
alimony award. Id. at 88-89. The Riley Court also noted the following in regard to fault:
"Husband's engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful conduct that led
to the divorce, present precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the trial
court to consider fault." Id. at 88.
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) reads: "Alimony may not be ordered for a
duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of
alimony for a longer period of time." Based on the previous statute cited in this paragraph,
and based on the sexual transmitted disease Mr. Boyer passed on to Mrs. Boyer while he was
still married to her, and also taking into account the problems this has caused the Petitioner,
Mrs. Boyer should be awarded a permanent alimony award.
The Court should have, but never made any specific findings or references regarding
Mr. Boyer's "fault", specifically he committing adultery. The fault aspect should have been
factored into the alimony analysis and calculation, but was not.
Issue 6: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in its alimony award by
not considering Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as a result of obtaining a social/venereal
disease from Mr. Boyer.
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal.
Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery.
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(Trial

Transcript, hereinafter: "TT" at pg. 487,11.24-25, pg. 489,1. 1, pg. 23,11. 17-22.) Testimony
was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that during the marriage she had contracted a sexual
transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-10, pg. 508,11. 5-17.) Testimony
was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that as a result of the sexually transmitted disease she
received from Mr. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer had to have surgery, where she had part of her cervix
removed and then she had a cone biopsy because she had carcinoma insi2, and as a further
result of this, Mrs. Boyer had to have a complete and total hysterectomy, where she had her
uterus and an ovary removed. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-17)
Utah courts follow the premise that, "[w]hen reviewing a [district] court determination
of alimony... an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion." Richardson, 201 P.3d
at 943 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted). The Richardson Court further reasoned that when
making alimony determinations, "a district court considers several factors, including (1) the
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to
produce sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Id.
(citations omitted).
A further analysis of alimony contains that "a district court also considers the primary
aims of alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of
each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Id.
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(citations omitted).
Further, Riley quotes Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b) which allows a court to consider
the fault of the parties in determining an alimony award. Riley 138 P.3d at 88. In Riley the
husband committed extra marital affairs, and the court considered "fault" when structuring its
alimony award. Id. at 88-89. The Riley Court also noted the following in regard to fault:
"Husband's engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful conduct that led
to the divorce, present precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the trial
court to consider fault." Id. at 88.
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) reads: "Alimony may not be ordered for a
duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of
alimony for a longer period of time." Based on the previous statute cited in this paragraph,
and based on the extreme health problems and surgeries that Mrs. Boyer had to endure
because of Mr. Boyer's actions, Mrs. Boyer should be awarded a permanent alimony award.
The Court should have, but never made any specific findings or references regarding
Mr. Boyer's "fault", specifically he committing adultery which caused Mrs. Boyer a myriad
of health problems. Mrs. Boyer received a sexually transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer
during the marriage, and further she has suffered and undergone surgeries, all of which only
occurred because of the "fault" of Mr. Boyer's adulterous affair,
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pawned on all of the

health problems Mrs. Boyer has associated with Mr. Boyer's that have resulted from her
receiving that sexually transmitted disease. The fault aspect should have been factored into
the alimony analysis and calculation, but was not.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Boyer seeks an equitable interest or offset of the partial interest that Mr. Boyer
has on the 25th Street building. (204 25th Street, Ogden, Utah).
Mrs. Boyer seeks a "Woodward" share of Mr. Boyer's retirement.
Mrs. Boyer seeks that alimony structure not reduce over time, but rather say at the
higher amount.
Mrs. Boyer seeks that the alimony award be changed from $1,428, to $1,457.
Mrs. Boyer seeks a permanent alimony award, however, at a minimum, she seeks to
have the Court determine how long her alimony award is for, and should not be smaller than
the length of the marriage.
Mrs. Boyer seeks the Court to include "fault" in its alimony determination.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2010.

KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC

Rand G. Lunceford
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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Titlc/Chapter/Section:
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Utah Code
Title 30 Husband and Wife
Chapter 3 Divorce
Section 5 Disposition of property «- Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of
debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -- Determination of alimony Nonmeritorious petition for modification.

30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children —
Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time ~~
Determination of alimony ~ Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every
decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental
expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses
such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health,
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4
which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents1 health, hospital, or
dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall Consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under

rage z o n

his chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
>rder is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
xpended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without
tierit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
,randparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been
ireviously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
ttorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to
rovide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity7 or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by
aying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
le marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of
jparation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall
insider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
andard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have
*en conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at
ie time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
andards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of
ie of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the
arital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
eatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
>mpensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been
mceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition
liich existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding
tmony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
vorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the
^ipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
•cumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
nsidered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's
proper conduct justifies that consideration.
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(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse.
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume
if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.
Amended by Chapter 285, 2010 General Session
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT STATB OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

DEBRA BOYER,

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
NUNC PRO TUNC TO JUNE 1, 2009

Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No: 074900511

DARREN BOYER,

Judge Michael D. Lyon
Commissioner Daniel W. Garner

Respondent.

This matter came on for Trial on Apri! 1,2 and 4, 2008, and oral argument on April 8 u d
,4.2008, before ,l,e District Court, the H o n o r * Michael D. Lyon, District Judge presiding. The
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah, The
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, John Cummings, Ogden, Utah. Having
considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench
^
~t,„.-i 9009 the Court now enters its formal
.on May 15, 2008 and the court's ruling from December 3, 2009, the oou
Decree:

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE NWC PRO TUNC TO 1UKE 1.2009
N U N C PRO TUNC T<
£ £ C v. « * » " * * * C i v i l N K m9m»'
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE NUN , f r | , „ , „ ,

p ag e,ofl0

lllfUlttl
VD31271378
,APO0S11

BOYER.DARREH

pages: 10

1.

Date of Marriage and Other Dates. The parties were married in Hennifer, Utah,

on July 10, 1993, The parties separated for the fust time in September, 2003, at which time the
Defendant moved back into the home in February or March, 2004. The parties have been separated
since January 9, 2007, and Petitioner filed for divorce on March 13,2007. Three (3) children have
been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Kayne Boyer, born July 29, 1995; Talon Boyer, bom
February 2, 1998; and Cormac Boyer, bom August 9, 2001.
2.

Custody. The Court has delineated in case law specifically Rule 4.903, Utah Code

Annotated, as well as statutory provisions of Title 30, and weighed in the best interest of the
children. The Court awards the parties joint physical custody and legal custody of the parties' minor
children. The Court agrees with Dr. Davies, who observed that giving one parent sole joint or legal
custody would unnecessarily restrict the other parent The Court finds that the best interest of the
children will be best served as much as possible with the parties making joint decisions regarding
health, education and general welfare. Further, the Court finds that if the Petitioner moves from the
community, the Court would consider changing the custody arrangement. See Parenting Plan
attached hereto as Exhibit "A11 and incorporated herein by reference,
3.

Visitation, As described by Dr. Davies, the parties shall have visitation under a 2:2:5

parenting time schedule. Monday and Tuesday with Respondent, Wednesday and Thursday with
Petitioner and then ever)' other Friday, Saturday and Sunday the parties alternate. In addition, the
parties have agreed that every Easter (Easter Break or school break), the children will be with the
Petitioner and every UEA holiday, the children will be with the Respondent. This parenting time
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allows stability with both parents, friends and is dynamic and sensitive to the needs of the children.
This arrangement remains in place as long as the Petitioner remains in the area and the Respondent
also facilitates by living geographically close.
4.

Primary Residence, The Petitioner's home is the primary residence for school and

church purpose. This residency will remain in effect as long as the parties stay within a twenty (20)
mile radius with each other. It is my expectation that Respondent will remain in the area to facilitate
this arrangement as per the assurances he made in Court. In the event that there is an impasse on one
of the key decisions that needs to be made, the Court appoints Dr. Dallas Empey, or such other
qualified person, to act as a parent-time coordinator, and the parties will equally pay initially that
expense and then, if necessary, bring the issue back to Court. If the Court feels that one part)' was
unreasonable, the Court reserves the right at that time to assess those expenses to the other parent.
5, '

Needs of fheChildrenPertaininfftoResidency: The Court, having interviewed the

children during the trial, the Court finds the following:
A,

The Court finds that Kayne wants to live with his father and, under no

circumstances does he want to move to Oklahoma. Kayne is very close to his father and they have
similar interest and activities. Kayne has expressed some resentfiilness toward his mother for not
allowing him to live with his father, and this concerns the Court. After some thought regarding
separating the children and having Kayne live with his father, the Court orders that the siblings shall
remain together.
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B.

The Court finds thai Talon is a buffer between both his parents and his

C.

The Court finds that Cormac is bonded to both parents and wants to be with

siblings.

his siblings. Cormac is dependent on his brothers for emotional support and all siblings will flourish
by remaining together.
6.

Mutual Restraint of the Parties, The Court finds that the children are happy and

well-adjusted with their custody arrangement, but these children are aware of the conflicts between
their parents. The Court strong suggests that the parties stop the fighting between themselves before
their arguing adversely affects their children. The Court orders the parties to desist in demeaning
one another and to govern their actions. The Court finds that both parents are emotionally stable and
can provide stability for their children. The Petitioner was the primary care giver in the beginning
but as the children grew older, the parties shared equally in that responsibility. In terms of the
kinship between step-parent, the Court finds the relationship with Mrs. Jessica Jacques to be positive
with the parties' minor children.
7.

Petitioner's Income. The Court finds the Petitioner is thirty-eight (38) years old arid

is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum.

She earns

approximately $11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. Based on the
prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the analysis of Respondent's
income, the Court finds that she can readily secure full-time employment at a rate at least equal to
her current wage. The Court also finds that Petitioner needs to work Mi-time to help support herself
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and the Court advises her of this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time
salary to Petitioner at her current hourly wage. The Court, therefore, imputes Petitioner's salary to
SI,993.00, which is equal to S4O6.00 per week multiplied by 4.333 weeks per month. After
deducting legal and mandatory deductions of approximately $399.00, the Court estimates the
Petitioner's nci income to be approximately S i ,594.00 per month. The Courts finds that Petitioner
wi 11 receive child support of $677.00 per month, giving the Petitioner a monthly income of $2,271.00
per month.
8»

Respondent's Income. The Court finds that the Respondent is employed as a stock

broker and financial advisor for Lindsco Private Provider ("LPL"). The Courtfindsthat Respondent
does not sale outside of his employment and that Respondent was employed by Smith Barney as a
stock broker from 1994-2003 earning approximately $160,000.00 per year. The Court finds that
Smith Barney reduced Petitioner's and other colleagues* incomes by reducing the size of their
commissions. In so doing, Respondent and colleague, Jeff VonCoin, left Smith Barney's employ in
2003 and secured employment with LPL, sharing office expenses. Since 2003, Respondent and Mr.
VonCoin have moved several times, each time improving the size and amenities of their offices.
Ascertaining Respondent's income has been difficult because he has not maintained adequate
accounting records that would normally be found in a business. Respondent's accountant has
prepared tax filings each year and did so from summaries provided by the Respondent without
adequate and normal ledger support, by reconciliation with bank statements. The Court finds that
Respondent's income tax returns are not reiiabfe because the supporting documents to his accountant
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were not reliable. The Court finds that the Respondent contends that he has a net income of
approximately $48,000.00 to $63,000,00 per year. The Court disagrees with that amount. The
evidence of his net income is not only inconsistent with the evidence presented by the parties*
standard of living, but the Court found the testimony of Clifford Grover particularly persuasive.
Using Exhibit P43 for its analysis, the Court finds that the Respondent's recorded net income of his
business of $55,068.00 on his Form 1120S to the IRS in 2005 and $37,708.00 in 2006. These
amounts already include a deduction for every operating expense Respondent claimed to the IRS.
The Court finds, however, that Respondent was very aggressive in taking large depreciation
deductions in both years and as Section 179 write-off in the first year of 2006. While he may
.legitimately claim these deductions with the IRS, they significantly reduce his cash-flow from his
business which the Court believes it should consider in calculating alimony and child support
because the cash savings from these deductions flows into his pocket. After deducting Respondent's
authorized nondeductibles, such as authorized portions of his meals ($6,584.00 in 2005, and
$10,621.00 in 2006, and that is based on the information provided to his own accountant), the Court
finds that the Respondent actually had a net discretionary cash flow of $43,558.00 in 2005, not
$5,568.00, DeductingRespondent'sincome from LPL, treasury refunds, lines of credit, Visa charges
and other loans enumerated in Exhibit "43", the Court finds that Respondent had additional direct
deposits from his business to his personal account of $58,534.00 in 2005 and $58,222.00 in 2006.
Thus, the evidence preponderates an income of $96,524.00 in 2005, and $ 122,563.00 in 2006. Using
the same analysis for 2007, Mr. Grover also opined that Respondent's income was $97,867.00 in
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2007. However, even Respondent admits that distractions of the divorce reduced his income in
2007. Considering alt of this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent's discretionary cash-flow
for his business for the purpose of establishing alimony and child-support, is approximately
$110,000.00 per year. I also believe that he has the potential to increase his income once the divorce
is behind him. The Court finds that after anticipated taxes, the Respondent has a net income of
approximately £6,600.00 per month, or S79,200.00 per year. In passing, the Court observes that
Respondent's claim offinancialdifficulty was the result of extravagant living.
9.

Petitioner's Budget and Expenses, The Petitioner estimates that her reasonable

monthly expenses, including the debt to her father and her post-separation credit-card debt of
approximately $6,067.00 per month. The Court finds that Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses
for herself and the children is approximately 54,967.00 per month. Combiner her net income of
$1,594.00 and child support from Respondent of $677.00 per month, the Petitioner's income is
$2,271.00 per month, which leaves Petitioner a $2,696.00 short-fall each month,
10.

Respondent's Budget and Expenses.

Respondent estimates his reasonable

expenses, excluding alimony and child support, to be $8,300.00. This amount includes all marital
debt to Petitioner's father and post-separation credit-card debt. The Court finds that Respondent's
reasonable monthly expenses for himself and the children is approximately $5,762.00 per month.
Adding the child-support obligation of $677.00 per month, the Respondent has reasonable monthly
expenses of $6,439,00 per month and leaves him with $217.00 per month,
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11.

Alimony. To equalize the parties' standard of living, the Court orders the Respondent

to pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, commencing
on July i, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to SI,000,00 per month on July 1, 2013, for
another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800,00 per month until December 3!,
2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at the
remarriage or death of the Petitioner.
12.

Chiid-Supnort The Court finds that Petitioner's gross monthly income is $ 1,993.00.

Respondent's gross monthly income is $9,167.00. The combined support is $2,056.00 for the
children, Petitioner's responsibility for the children is eighteen percent'(18%). Respondent's
responsibility for the children is eighty-two percent (82%). For purpose of the child support
worksheet Petitioner will have the children 183 nights per year, while the Respondent will have the
/
"children 182 nights per year. The Court finds that caJcuJation to be $676.84, rounded up to $677.00,
beginning July 1, 2008. The Respondent shall also maintain health insurance for the benefit of the
parties' minor children. Each part)', however, shall pay one-half (54) of those premium costs and onehalf QA) of all uninsured medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children.
13*

Property. The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest in a

commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The Court
finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included the building equity
of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business
liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. The Court orders that all of the property
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from his business, including the building which the Court finds to be $20,300.00, be awarded to
Respondent.
14,

Marital Debts. The parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support

their extravagant lifestyle. The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card
debt at the time of their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay
off the debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the marital debt
that existed at the time of the parties' separation. The Petitioner will assume all of the debt to her
father and all post-separation debt incurred without Respondent's knowledge or approval, including
her credit-card debt. Respondent will assume ail debt that he incurred since the date of the
separation. The Court is mindful that this is settling the Respondent with a substantial amount of
debt, but has already factored that debt in large measure into the alimony structure.
15.

Personal Property. The Court awards each party his or her retirement accounts.

Respondent's retirement account is valued at approximately 512,500.00. Petitioner's retirement
account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the rest of the parties' agreement
with respect to personal property.
16.

Tax Deductions. In. even years beginning in tax year 2008, the Defendant shall be

allowed to claim as head of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax
purposes for state and federal taxation and the Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of
household one (1) minor child as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal
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taxation. In odd years beginning with the tax year 2009, Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head
of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal
taxation and that the Respondent shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (1) minor child
as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation as long as there are three
(3) children to claim, When there are only two (2) children eligible to be claimed as tax exemptions
for income tax purposes, each part)7 shall claim one(l} child each year. When there in only one (1)
child to claim as head of household and as a tax exemption, the parties shall alternate claimmg that
child ever>' other year. However, in order for the Respondent to be eligible to claim any children as
and for income tax exemptions, he must be current in his child-support obligation on December 31 st
of each year he wishes to claim the children.
DATED this ^ 7 day of January, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

AA

DISTRICT COURT JUD

X

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE NUNC PRO TUNC TO JUNE 1, 2009 postage prepaid this S O a y of
January, 2010, to the following;
Debra Boyer
1374 W. 1100N.
Ogden, UT 84404
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JOHN CUMMINGS (#5269)
Attorney for Respondent
3856 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: 801.627. J110
Facsimile: 801.627.1120
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

DEBRA BOYER,
Petitioner,

AMENDED FINDENGS OF FACT AND
! CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUNC PRO
TUNC TO JUNE 1,2009

vs.
DARREN BO YER,
Respondent.

Civil No: 074900511
Judge Michael D. Lyon
Commissioner Daniel W. Gamer

This matter came on for Trial on April 1, 2 and 4, 2008, and oral argument on. April 8 and
-14,2008, before the District Court, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, District Judge presiding. The
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah. The
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, John Cummings, Ogden, Utah. Having
considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench
on May 15, 2008 arid the courts ruling from December 3, 2009, the Court now enters its formal
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
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FINDINGS OF FACT
It

Date of Marriage and Other Dates. The parties were married in Hennifer, Utah,

on July 10, 1993. The parties separated for the first time in September, 2003, at which time the
Defendant moved back into the home in February or March, 2004. The parties have been separated
since January 9, 2007, and Petitioner filed for divorce on March 13, 2007. Three (3) children have
been born as issue of this marriage, to wit; Kayne Boyer, bora July 29, 1995; Talon Boyer, bom
February' 2, 1998; and Cormac Boyer, born August 9, 2001.
2.

Custody. The Court has delineated in case law specifically Rule 4.903, Utah Code

Annotated, as well as statutory provisions of Title 30, and weighed in the best interest of the
children. The Court awards the parties joint physical custody and legal custody of the parties' minor
children. The Court agrees with Dr. Davies, who observed that giving one parent sole joint or legal
custody would unnecessarily restrict the other parent. The Court finds that the best interest of the
children will be best served as much as possible with the parties making joint decisions regarding
health, education and general welfare. Further, the Court finds that if the Petitioner moves from the
community, the Court would consider changing the custody arrangement. See Parenting Plan
attached hereto as Exhibit "AH and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

Visitation. As described by Dr. Davies, the parties shall have visitation under a 2:2:5

parenting time schedule. For example: Monday and Tuesday with Respondent, Wednesday and
Thursday with Petitioner and then ever)' other Friday, Saturday and Sunday the parties alternate. In
addition, the parties have agreed that ever)' Easter (Easter break or school break) the children will
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
NUNC PPsO TUNC TO JUNE 1 1 2009
Dcbrs Boyer v. Darren Boyer; Civil No: 07*19005 H
Page 2 of! I

be with the Petitioner and every UEA holiday the children will be with the Respondent, This
parenting time allows stability with both parents, friends and is dynamic and sensitive to the needs
of the children. This arrangement remains in place as long as the Petitioner remains in the area and
the Respondent also facilitates by living geographically close,
Primary Residence. The Petitioner's home is the primary7 residence for school and

4.

church purpose. This residency will remain in effect as long as the parties stay within a twenty (20)
mile radius with each other. It is my expectation that Respondent will remain in the area to facilitate
this arrangement as per the assurances he made in Court. In the event that there is an impasse on one
of the key decisions that needs to be made, the Court appoints Dr. Dallas Empey, or such other
qualified person, to act as a parent-time coordinator, and the parties will equally pay initially that
expense and then, if necessary, bring the issue back to Court. If the Court feels that one party was
unreasonable, the Court reserves the right at that time to assess those expenses to the other parent.
5.

Needs of the Children Pertaining to Residency: The Court, having interviewed the

children during the trial, the Court finds the following:
A.

The Court finds that Kayne wants to live with his father and, under no

circumstances does he want to move to Oklahoma. Kayne is very close to his father and they have
similar interest and activities. Kayne has expressed some resentfulness toward his mother for not
allowing him to live with his father, and this concerns the Court. After some thought regarding
separating the children and having Kayne live with his father, the Court orders that the siblings shall
remain together.
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B.

The Court finds that Talon is a buffer between both his parents and his

C

The Court finds that Cormac is bonded to both parents and wants to be with

siblings.

his siblings. Cormac is dependent on his brothers for emotional support and all siblings will flourish
by remaining together.
6.

Mutual Restraint of the Parties. The Court finds that the children are happy and

well-adjusted with their custody arrangement, but these children are aware of the conflicts between
their parents. The Court strong suggests that the parties stop the fighting between themselves before
their arguing adversely affects their children. The Court orders the parties to desist in demeaning
one another and to govern their actions, The Court finds that both parents are emotionally stable and
can provide stability for their children. The Petitioner was the primary care giver in the beginning
but as the children grew older, the parties shared equally in that responsibility. In terms of the
kinship between step-parent, the Court finds the relationship with Mrs. Jessica Jacques to be positive
with the parties' minor children,
7.

Petitioner's income. The Court finds the Petitioner is thirty-eight (38) years old and

is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum.

She earns

approximately $11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. Based on the
prodigious work that she did in pulling together thefinancialrecords for the analysis of Respondent's
income the Court finds that she can readily secuve full-time employment at a rate at least eotual to
her current wage. The Court also finds that Petitioner needs to work full-time to help support herself
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and the Court advises her of this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time
salary to Petitioner at her current hourly wage. The Court, therefore, imputes Petitioner's salary to
$1,993.00, which is equal to $406.00 per week multiplied by 4.333 weeks per month. After
deducting legal and mandatory deductions of approximately $399.00, the Court estimates the
Petitioner's net income to be approximately $1,594,00 per month, The Courts finds that Petitioner
will receive child support of $677.00 per month, giving the Petitioner a monthly income of $2,271.00
per month.
8.

Respondent's Income, The Court finds that the Respondent is employed as a stock

broker and financial advisor for Lindsco Private Provider ("LPL"). The Court finds that Respondent
does not sale outside of his employment and that Respondent was employed by Smith Barney as a
stock broker from 1994-2003 earning approximately $160,000.00 per year, The Court finds that
Smith Barney reduced Petitioner's and other colleagues1 incomes by reducing the size of their
commissions. In so doing, Respondent and colleague, Jeff VonColn, left Smith Barney's employ in
2003 and secured employment with LPL, sharing office expenses. Since 2003, Respondent and Mr.
VonColn have moved several times, each time improving the size and amenities of their offices.
'Ascertaining Respondent's income has been difficult because he has not maintained adequate
accounting records that would normally be found in a business. Respondent's accountant has
prepared tax filings each year and did so from summaries provided by the Respondent without
adequate and normal ledger support, by reconciliation with bank statements. The Court finds that
Respondent's income tax returns are not rel iable because the supporting documents to his accountant
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were not reliable. The Court finds that the Respondent contends chat he has a net income of
approximately $48,000.00 to $63,000.00 per year. The Court disagrees with that amount. The
evidence of his net income is not only inconsistent with the evidence presented by the parties'
standard of living, but the Court found the testimony of Clifford Grover particularly persuasive.
Using Exhibit P43 for its analysis, the Court finds that the Respondent's recorded net income of his
business of 555,068.00 on his for 1120S to the IRS in 2005 and 537,708.00 in 2006. These amounts
already include a deduction for ever)' operating expense Respondent claimed to the IRS. The Court
finds, however, that Respondent was very' aggressive in taking large depreciation deductions in both
years and as Section 179 write-off in the first year of 2006. While he may legitimately claim these
deductions with the IRS, they significantly reduce his cash-flow from his business which the Court
believes it should consider in calculating alimony and child support because the cash savings from
these deductions flows into his pocket. After deducting Respondent's authorized nondeductibles,
such as authorized portions of his meals ($6,584,00 in 2005, and $10,621.00 in 2006, and that is
based on the information provided to his own accountant), the Court finds that the Respondent
actually had a net discretionary' cash flow of $43,558.00 in 2005, not $5,568,00. Deducting
Respondent's income from LPL, treasury refunds, lines of credit, Visa charges and other loans
enumerated in Exhibit n 43'\ the Court finds that Respondent had additional direct deposits from his
business to his personal account of $58,534,00 in 2005 and $58,222,00 in 2006. Thus, the evidence
preponderates an income of $96,524,00 in 2005, and $122,563.00 in 2006. Using the same analysis
for 2007, Mr. Grover also opined that Respondent's income was S97..867.00 in 2007. However, even
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Respondent admits that distractions of the divorce reduced his income in 2007. Considering all of
this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent's discretionary cash-flow for his business for the
purpose of establishing alimony and child-support, is approximately $110,000.00 per year. [ also
believe that he has the'potential to increase his income once the divorce is behind him. The Court
finds that after anticipated taxes, the Respondent has a net income of approximately $6,600.00 per
month or 279,200.00 per year. In passing, the Court observes that Respondent's claim of financial
difficult)' was the result of extravagant living.
9.

Petitioner's Budget and Expenses. The Court estimates that the Petitioner has

reasonable monthly expenses, including the debt to her father and her post-separation credit-card
debt of approximately $6,067.00 per month. The Court finds that Petitioner's reasonable monthly
expenses for herself and the children is approximately $4,967.00 per month. Combiner her net
income of SJ ,594.00 and child support from Respondent of $677.00 per month, the Petitioner's
income is $2,271.00 per month, which leaves Petitioner a $2,696.00 short-fall each month,
10.

Respondent's Budget and Expenses.

Respondent estimates his reasonable

expenses, excluding alimony and child support, to be $8,300.00. This amount includes ail marital
debt to Petitioner's father and post-separation credit-card debt. The Court finds that Respondent's
reasonable monthly expenses for himself and the children is approximately $5,762.00 per month.
Adding the child-support obligation of $677.00 per month, the Respondent has reasonable monthly
expenses of $6,439.00 per month and leaves him with a $217.00 per month short-fall.
11.

Alimony. To equalize the parties1 standard of li ving, the Court orders the Respondent
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to pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, commencing
on July 1, 2008, Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to $1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for
another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31,
2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at the
remarriage or death of the Petitioner.
12,

Child-Support. The Court finds that Petitioner's gross monthly income is $ 1,993,00.

Respondent's gross monthly income is $9,167.00. The combined support is $2,056.00 for the
children. Petitioner's responsibility for the children is eighteen percent (18%). Respondent's
responsibility for the children is eighty-two percent (82%). For purpose of the child support
worksheet, Petitioner will have the children 183 nights per year, while the Respondent will have the
children 182 nights per year. The Court finds that calculation to be $676.84, rounded up to $677.00.
The Respondent shall also maintain health insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor children.
Each party, however, shall pay one-half (l/2) of those premium costs and one-half (Vi) of all uninsured
medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children.
13.

Property. The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest in a

commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The Court
finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included the building equity
of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business
liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00, The Court orders that ail of the property
from his business including the building, which the Court finds to be $20,300.00, be awarded to
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Respondent,
14.

Marital Debts, The parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support

their extravagant lifestyle. The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card
debt at the time of their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay
off the debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the marital debt
that existed at the time of the parties' separation. The Petitioner will assume all of the debt to her
father and all post-separation debt incurred without Respondent's knowledge or approval, including
her credit-card debt. Respondent will assume all debt that he incurred since the.date of the
separation. The Court is mindful that this is settling the Respondent with a substantial amount of
debt, but has already factored that debt in large measure into the alimony structure.
15,

Personal Property. The Court awards each part)' his or her retirement accounts.

Respondent's retirement account is valued at approximately $12,500.00, Petitioner's retirement
account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the rest of the parties' agreement
with respect to personal property.
16/Tax Deduction. In even years beginning in tax year 2008, the Defendant shall be allowed
to claim as head of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for
state and federal taxation and the Petitioner shall be allowed to claim ss head of household one (1)
mmor child as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation. In odd years
beginning with the tax year 2009, Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of household two (2)
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minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation and that the
Respondent shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (I) minor child as tax exemptions
for income tax purposes for state and federal tavXation as long as there are three (3) children to claim.
When there are only two (2) children eligible to be claimed as tax exemptions for income tax
purposes, each part)' shall claim one (1) child each year. When there in only one (1) child to claim
as head of household and as a tax exemption, the parties shall alternate claiming that child every
other year. However, in order for the Respondent to be eligible to claim any children as and for
income tax exemptions, he must be current in his child-support obligation on December 31 st of each
year he wishes to claim the children.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1,
above.

The parties shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce as set out in the Findings of Fact
f

•

J

DATED this pffiday of Janiary,@WO.
BY THE COURT:

DISTWcfcbURf JUDGE

AMENDED FINDINGS OF PACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
NUNC PRO TUNC TO JUNE I, 2009
Dsbra Boyer v. Danen Boyer; Civil No: 074900511
PfigelOofll

NOTICE TO RESPONDENT
TO: RESPONDENT
Pursuant to Utah Rules ofCivil Procedure §7(f)(2), the proposed FINDINGS OF FACTAND
CONCLUSIONS OF LA WwiU befiledwith the above-entitled Courtfive(5) days after service upon
you to the Honorable District Court Judge for her/his signature. Your Objection, if any, must be
filed with the Court within five (5) days after service. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
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I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUNC PRO TUNC JUNE J, 2009 postage
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Debra Beyer
1374 W. 1100N.
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Kristopher K. Greenwood (8581)
Rand Lunceford (11710)
KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
195 Historic 25th Street, Suite 304
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801)475-8800
Facsimile: (801) 475-9800
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

DEBRA BOYER,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Petitioner and Appellant,

04/23/1

vs.
Case No. 07490051 IDA
DARREN BOYER,
Respondent and Appelle.

Judge: Michael D. Lyon
Comm.: Daniel Gamer

Notice is hereby given that Petitioner, DEBRA BOYER, appeals to the Utah Court of
Appeals the final order of the Honorable Michael D. Lyon entered in this matter on March 25,2010.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED this ^ 3

day of U^l^t

2010.

KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC

Rand G. Lunceford
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 7^P day of n D h
1
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the following:
©Via Mail (Postage Pre-paid)

DYia Fax

John Cummings
Attorney for Darren Boyer
3856Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403

cc: client
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QVia Hand Delivery

